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A Framework for Results Based Management in Fisheries 1 
Abstract 2 
We present a framework for Results Based Management (RBM) of commercial fisheries. The 3 
core idea of RBM is to reduce micro-management by delegating management responsibility 4 
to resource users. The RBM framework represents an industrial organization approach to co-5 
management and comprises three defining processes, conducted by three independent 6 
“agents”: 1) an “authority” defines specific and measurable and achievable objectives 7 
(outcome targets, OTs) for the utilization of fisheries resources, 2) resource user organizations 8 
(termed “operators”) take responsibility for achieving these OTs and provide documentation 9 
that 3) allows independent “auditors” to evaluate the achievement of OTs. Using incentive 10 
mechanisms, notably deregulation, RBM grants operators the flexibility to develop and 11 
implement innovative and cost-effective ways to achieve OTs. The feasibility of 12 
implementing RBM in five European fisheries was investigated in cooperation with relevant 13 
stakeholders through artificial planning processes and computer simulations. The operators 14 
involved were enthusiastic, and new management plans were drafted based on the framework. 15 
These included socio-economic OTs in addition to traditional stock objectives, encompassing 16 
an ecosystem approach. Several issues are in need of further research in order to consolidate 17 
the approach and prepare the ground for practical implementation, including: the specification 18 
of the legal and regulatory framework required to underpin RBM, details of transitional 19 
arrangements when shifting towards RBM (including cost-sharing) and the development of 20 
necessary organizational capacity for operators. Initially, we therefore envisage the 21 
framework being applied to high value single species fisheries, with a limited number of 22 
participants, which are adequately represented by a competent organization.   23 
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1. Introduction 26 
Many marine fisheries suffered from the ‘Tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin, 1968) as they 27 
became overexploited in the 20th century (Worm et al., 2006), largely due to rapid 28 
industrialisation, capitalisation and poor management (Caddy and Cochrane, 2001). In 29 
response, a centralised fisheries management approach was consolidated by the New Ocean 30 
Regime, which instituted the coastal state as owner and manager of marine resources inside its 31 
Exclusive Economic Zone, with international collaborative management for straddling and 32 
migratory stocks (Dyke, 1995). This approach has begun to succeed in certain regional seas 33 
(Worm et al., 2009; Fernandes and Cook, 2013; Cardinale et al., 2013), but requires 34 
significant investments in compliance measures, regulation and monitoring. Such investments 35 
are typically covered by public funds and represent indirect subsidies (Shrank et al., 2003; 36 
Sumaila et al., 2007) and where they are insufficient, stocks continue to be overexploited 37 
(Worm et al., 2009; Costello et al., 2012;Fernandes et al. 2017).  38 
This state-centred approach tends to lead to paternalistic (top-down) and regulation intensive 39 
management systems that exclude resource users from knowledge production and decision-40 
making (Lane and Stephenson, 2000; Degnbol, 2003; Jentoft and Mikalsen, 2003). This 41 
contrasts with the growing recognition that successful management of fisheries and other 42 
socio-ecological systems must include the constructive engagement of users (Lane and 43 
Stephenson, 2000; Degnbol, 2003; Parma et al., 2006; Ostrom, 2009; Gutiérrez et al., 2011; 44 
Deacon, 2012). The strategy of assigning management responsibility to user groups within a 45 
formalised management systems is not new (Jentoft, 1989) and has shown promise in some  46 
cases, but receives little attention (Deacon, 2012). There is little general discussion on how to 47 
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design a framework for an ‘industrial organization’ approach to co-management with 48 
relevance to modern capture fisheries (Lane and Stephenson, 1998).  49 
Aiming to reinvigorate discussion, promote research and devise practical initiatives in this 50 
context, we present and discuss a specific approach which aims to delegate fisheries 51 
management responsibility to resource users. The conceptual basis for the proposed approach 52 
is Results Based Management (RBM), combined with incentive mechanisms for stimulating  53 
active involvement of user groups in management and information gathering, namely the 54 
notions of a “reversed burden of proof” (Degnbol, 2003; Fitzpatrick et al. 2011; Linke and 55 
Jentoft, 2012) and “cost recovery” (Stokes et al., 2006). This is based on the idea that private 56 
users of public resources should be held accountable for the costs of implementing 57 
management measures and of monitoring to ensure that the negative impact of the resource 58 
use is acceptable.  59 
Aligned with New Public Management ideas (Rhodes, 1996), RBM has guided reforms in 60 
national and international organizations, including UN agencies, the OECD and the World 61 
Bank (Binnendijk, 2001; Mayne, 2007; UNDP, 2007; Hatton and Schroeder, 2007). The core 62 
idea of RBM is to delegate responsibility for achieving defined results to a user level. The 63 
European Commission (EC) expressed this idea as follows:   64 
The industry can be given more responsibility through self-management. […] instead 65 
of establishing rules about how to fish, the rules focus on the outcome and the more 66 
detailed implementation decisions would be left to the industry. Public authorities 67 
would set the limits within which the industry must operate, […] and then give 68 
industry the authority to develop the best solutions economically and technically (EC, 69 
2009). 70 
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The proposed framework for RBM was developed in an EC funded research project. The 71 
main deficiencies that the framework aimed to address were the structural problems of the 72 
EC’s previous Common Fisheries Policy (CFP): a top-down and micro-management approach 73 
with insufficient opportunities for industry involvement, imprecise policy objectives, a short-74 
term focus, and poor compliance (EC, 2009). RBM shifts the burden of proof, and delegates 75 
responsibility for planning and implementing management measures to organised resource 76 
user groups, the “operators”. Relevant “authorities” still define policy goals for the public’s 77 
natural resources, but it is left to operators to develop workable management plans and to 78 
provide the information necessary for “auditors” to conduct an independent audit of the extent 79 
to which the goals are met. The policy goals are made explicit through the definition of 80 
outcome targets (OTs) which are specific, measurable, and achievable objectives defined by 81 
the authority in consultation with operators.   82 
The management of rock lobsters (Jasus edwardsii, Palinuridae and Sagmariasus verreauxi, 83 
Palinuridae) in New Zealand (Yandle et al., 2011) is regarded as an advanced example of 84 
RBM arrangements in fisheries on an organisational scale (Nielsen et al., 2015), as opposed to 85 
the scale of individual fishers or vessels (Fitzpatrick et al., 2011). Secure harvest rights 86 
created incentives for quota holders to rebuild resources to levels with higher productivity and 87 
profitability (Miller and Breen, 2010). In addition, a cost-recovery regime encouraged the 88 
industry to enhance the cost-effectiveness of management and research (Stokes et al., 2006). 89 
While the statutory requirement is that stock biomasses should be at, or above, levels that 90 
support Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY), industry harvest strategies in some cases aim to 91 
achieve lower exploitation rates consistent with Maximum Economic Yield. In some cases, 92 
the industry refrained from harvesting its full allocation in order to build stocks up to more 93 
profitable levels (Breen et al., 2009; Miller and Breen, 2010).  94 
5 
 
 
Taking inspiration from this and other relevant cases (Dixon and Sloan, 2007; James, 2008; 95 
Featherstone and Rogers, 2008; see also cases referred to in section 2), RBM is proposed as 96 
an ideal type (Cahnman, 1965) of an industrial organization approach to co-management. In 97 
this paper, we describe an RBM framework and study its potential application in pilot studies 98 
of four European fisheries. To invoke change, such as that proposed here with RBM, the 99 
framework must be adapted to a given governance setting and build on the institutions and 100 
organisations already in place. In our conclusion, we consider the prospects of moving 101 
towards RBM arrangements and identify issues in need of further research in order to refine 102 
and consolidate the proposed approach. 103 
2. Materials and Methods 104 
Previously, Nielsen et al. (2015) developed an RBM prototype, based on relevant RBM 105 
literature (EC, 2009; Fitzpatrick, 2011), fisheries management systems with RBM aspects 106 
(Lane and Stephenson, 2000; Molares and Freire, 2003; Townsend and Shotton, 2008; Yang 107 
et al., 2010; Zacharin et al., 2008; Deacon, 2012; Yang et al., 2014), and advice from 108 
stakeholders and fishery managers in New Zealand and Europe. The initial prototype outlined 109 
a process for developing, approving and evaluating a Management Plan (MP), and specified 110 
the generic division of labour and manner of cooperation between the associated agents. The 111 
prototype was applied to pilot case studies in a series of artificial planning processes as 112 
described below (Section 2.3). An evaluation of these processes provided a basis for 113 
extending and adapting further prototypes, which were subsequently applied and evaluated in 114 
a similar process. In the following section, we briefly present basic conditions that facilitate 115 
implementation of RBM (section 2.1) before presenting the final prototype (section 2.2).  116 
  117 
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2.1 Enabling conditions for an industrial organization approach to co-management 118 
With top-down management as the starting point, a move towards co-management will 119 
necessarily proceed from institutionally unfavourable conditions (Jentoft, 1989). Pomeroy and 120 
Berkes (1997) emphasise the need for a proactive government to make co-management work. 121 
The role of government is crucial with regard to establishing a legal framework that enables 122 
an effective and transparent delegation of responsibility to resource users. While the legal 123 
basis underpinning the proposed RBM is considered beyond the scope of this work, we draw 124 
attention to four essential aspects. First, membership of authorised resource user organisations 125 
should be mandatory as incomplete organisational representation will reduce the ability for 126 
resource user organisations to decide on comprehensive management actions. Second, 127 
resource user organisations must be able to make binding decisions on behalf of their 128 
members through an effective and legitimate decision-making mechanism (Jentoft, 1989; 129 
Townsend, 2010a, b). Third, as RBM incurs a new practical and financial burden of 130 
management on users, it must also include strong positive incentives to foster industry 131 
acceptance. One important incentive in RBM is deregulation, granting operators the flexibility 132 
to design locally workable management solutions provided that OTs are met. Long-term user 133 
rights, either held individually or by a group, is likely to represent the most powerful type of 134 
incentive: promoting long-term sustainability also increases the productivity of the resource, 135 
and thereby the value of the rights (Grafton et al., 2006; Deacon, 2012). Fourth, resource user 136 
organisations need to foster leadership, and develop the organisational capacity, know-how 137 
and the mechanisms for conflict resolution required to take on responsibility for management 138 
functions. These abilities are typically developed over long time spans, although recent 139 
experience with the Advisory Councils in Europe have helped (Hegland and Wilson, 2009; 140 
Stange et al., 2014). 141 
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2.2 Framework for Results Based Management in Fisheries 142 
The RBM (Fig. 1) operationalises RBM through a contract (Townsend, 2010b) between an 143 
“authority” and one or more “operators”. In practice, this contract is an MP, proposed by the 144 
operator(s) and approved by the authority. The RBM stipulates a conditional reallocation of 145 
responsibilities and provides a template for a process that empowers resource users, enhances 146 
transparency, and enables the use of locally adapted management measures. Representing 147 
public interests, the basic mandate of the authority is to ensure that its global policy objectives 148 
are fulfilled. This responsibility is not delegated with RBM. OTs are defined to contribute to 149 
the fulfilment of existing policies objectives. 150 
[Fig. 1 about here] 151 
The performance of an MP is evaluated by a third agent, an external “auditor”, which also 152 
monitors that both parties stick to pre-agreed timelines and process steps. The auditor 153 
enhances mutual accountability and reduces the risk of imbalanced relationships between 154 
cooperating parties. Examples of these are: a lack of downward accountability (Berkes, 2009), 155 
reduced proclivity of civil servants to defend public interests due to tight cooperation with 156 
industry (Singleton, 1999), and a reluctance of the authority to delegate power (Moynihan, 157 
2006).  158 
The RBM process begins with dialogues between the authority and operator(s) to facilitate a 159 
shared understanding of goals and expectations. Subsequently, the authority prepares an MP 160 
invitation, specifying the OTs to be achieved. The authority may arrange a process for 161 
involving potentially affected interests beyond those of the fisheries sector in the formulation 162 
of OTs. OTs can only be defined in terms of indicators that operators can be expected to be 163 
able to control to a sufficient extent through relevant management actions. The OTs define the 164 
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area of responsibility for operators. Beyond the OTs the responsibility to achieve policy goals 165 
remains with the authority.  166 
The operator then proposes an MP detailing how OTs will be achieved through a set of 167 
measures. To do so they need to harness and finance the required technical expertise, 168 
contracted externally or kept in-house at their own cost. The delegation of responsibility for 169 
planning and management requires that resource user organisations will employ this expertise, 170 
just as is the case for authorities in top-down management systems. The MP establishes how 171 
the fisheries will be monitored, controlled, documented and how and by whom data will be 172 
analysed. These functions require services that the operator may take upon itself or outsource 173 
to competent organisations. Finally, the MP identifies audit dates.  174 
The MP includes (graduated) sanctions in case OTs are not achieved (e.g. a harvest control 175 
rule with inbuilt catch reductions if biomass thresholds are not met). The presence of such 176 
collective sanctions may encourage the operator to develop internal control mechanisms in 177 
order to avoid losses due to non-compliant members. Most likely, however, operators will 178 
need external control and enforcement (e.g. provided by the authority) to ensure compliance 179 
and to provide independent information (e.g. regarding the quality of catch data). From the 180 
perspective of the authority and its commitment to public policies, the issue of control resorts 181 
simply to whether OTs are achieved. It is for the independent auditor to confirm such 182 
achievement, on the basis of its evaluation of the appropriate documentation. 183 
The authority examines the MP proposal, and may request revisions or clarifications until it 184 
meets pre-agreed conditions, i.e. a strategy for achieving OTs and for obtaining adequate 185 
audit information. This step could involve a thorough scientific evaluation, e.g. a 186 
Management Strategy Evaluation (Punt et al., 2017), but a less formalised expert judgment 187 
process could be used for small scale, low value, or data-poor fisheries. The authority’s 188 
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approval serves to provide a safeguard against poor proposals and does not relieve operators 189 
of their principal responsibility to achieve OTs.  190 
Before approving an MP proposal, the authority should arrange a public hearing to promote 191 
transparency and allow stakeholders other than those affiliated with operators to comment on 192 
the proposal. Representing public interests, the authority decides whether or not to take this 193 
feedback into account.  194 
The operator is responsible for implementing the MP and for collecting the information 195 
required for an audit of its performance. As mentioned, it may do so in cooperation with 196 
relevant hired expertise. Based on the information provided by operators, an appointed auditor 197 
assesses the extent to which OTs are achieved. To maintain credibility and legitimacy, the 198 
auditor should be independent of both authority and operators. The audit provides the 199 
authority with a basis to make decisions: if OTs are met the operator continues with activities 200 
according to the MP. If not, the authority may request revisions, set stricter requirements, or 201 
implement pre-agreed sanctions. To enhance transparency, the authority should provide a log 202 
of key events in the process and make it available externally. As a minimum, the log includes 203 
the MP invitation and minutes of key meetings, including the MP hearing.  204 
In the ideal model of RBM presented above, the industry bears the responsibility and costs for 205 
collection of fisheries data and implementation of management measures. In practice, 206 
however, it may not always be considered appropriate to confer these costs to the industry 207 
immediately. Cost sharing arrangements, however, do not preclude that the industry could 208 
have the formal responsibility for the relevant tasks.  209 
The MP is subjected to a range of uncertainties and externalities. This implies that operators 210 
cannot be expected to achieve OTs under all circumstances (e.g. unfavourable environmental 211 
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conditions). This is a common contract situation in which it is impractical, costly or even 212 
impossible for the contracting parties to address all contingencies ex ante. In general, failure 213 
to deliver the terms of contracts is addressed ex post by the courts, which determine whether 214 
the contractor has performed in ‘good faith’ (Burton, 1980; Armour et al., 2009). Similarly in 215 
RBM, if OTs are not met, the auditor judges whether the operator has implemented the MP in 216 
‘good faith’, and taken reasonable measures to achieve OTs. This provides the basis for the 217 
authority to set new conditions when the MP is revised and/or to introduce sanctions. The 218 
ultimate sanction for operators consistently performing in ‘bad faith’ could be termination of 219 
the RBM approach, and a consequent re-installment of top-down management.  220 
 2.3 Pilot studies 221 
 222 
It was not possible to study actual implementation of the RBM in fisheries due to several 223 
reasons. First, this would require that the major outcome of the project, the proposed RBM 224 
approach, was available at an early stage of the project. Second, actual implementation would 225 
require much more time and support by policy makers and stakeholders than what is normally 226 
available to a research project. Third, and probably of most significance, the enabling 227 
conditions for the RBM (described in 2.2) were only partially available in the pilot studies.  228 
The feasibility of implementing RBM was, therefore, studied through artificial planning 229 
processes in collaboration with candidate agencies in the respective roles of operators and 230 
authority. The pilot studies were presented to these agencies as an invitation to participate in a 231 
study with the aim to develop alternative management arrangements on a voluntary basis. The 232 
research was organized in accordance with the process outlined above for developing and 233 
evaluating an MP with the following steps: 234 
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1. An MP invitation was prepared for each pilot study by the relevant authority. The MP 235 
invitation defined the OTs for resource users to meet. It also contained a guideline for 236 
developing the MP, and listed the required elements to be addressed.  237 
2. Responding to the MP invitation, operators developed an MP. The MPs were refined until 238 
the authority had confirmed that all required elements were in place and thus could approve 239 
the MP.   240 
 3. The performance of MPs with regard to OTs was assessed using model simulations. This 241 
provided a basis for auditors to evaluate MPs regarding sustainability, applicability and risks.  242 
The respective roles of authority and operators were performed by local relevant actors in the 243 
pilot studies to the extent possible, and were facilitated by research teams from the project. To 244 
avoid the risks of ambiguity of roles of researchers (Dankel et al., 2015), the project was 245 
organised such that teams of project researchers would facilitate one role only, consistent with 246 
the outlined RBM.  247 
The pilot study approach faced a number of limitations of which the most significant were: 248 
 The simulation of the RBM process was limited to the steps of developing and 249 
evaluating MPs. The subsequent steps of 1) the authority requesting revisions or 250 
implementing sanctions if OTs were not met and 2) of operators adapting their MPs in 251 
response were not simulated. These steps need to be implemented and evaluated in 252 
order to consolidate the RBM approach, but this could not be achieved in a three 253 
three-year research project.  254 
 The simulation approaches differed between pilot studies and could not provide a 255 
basis for evaluating outcomes of all OTs in some cases. 256 
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 The simulated nature of the pilot studies implies that the expressed attitudes of the 257 
relevant agents in the pilot studies might have been influenced by the fact that the 258 
RBM was not implemented in reality. 259 
The pilot studies were selected to provide a range from simple (single species, single nation) 260 
to complex (multispecies, multinational) fisheries and management contexts, and to reflect 261 
variation in the availability and quality of data (Table 1). The Mediterranean pilot study had 262 
resource constraints which did not permit model simulation, so the evaluation of the 263 
feasibility of the RBM was limited to a role-play event with participation from relevant local 264 
user organisations and representatives of national fisheries administrations. This case is not 265 
considered further here, but information on this, as well as more details on concepts and pilot 266 
studies (e.g. management plans, associated documentation needs and responsibilities, cost 267 
sharing arrangements, and feedback from stakeholders) are available in project reports at 268 
www.ecofishman.eu.   269 
[Table 1 about here] 270 
2.3.1 The Icelandic lumpfish fishery 271 
The Icelandic lumpfish (Cyclopterus lumpus, Cyclopteridae) gillnet fishery is relatively 272 
simple in terms of biology and management. Bycatches are limited and catch, effort and 273 
market statistics are available. However, the fishery is data poor with regard to stock 274 
assessment. The Marine Research Institute (MRI) estimates stock status based on indices from 275 
the Icelandic Groundfish Survey and a gillnet survey, which are considered to provide a 276 
reliable basis for advice (WGLUMP, 2015). Traditionally, only the lumpfish roe is sold, but 277 
niche markets for the meat have emerged, although these are unstable and involve low profit 278 
margins. 279 
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The Icelandic Ministry of Industries and Innovation (IMII) manages the fishery in 280 
consultation with the Marine Research Institute (MRI), the Directorate of Fisheries and the 281 
industry, considering advice from the MRI, regional needs, and market conditions. There is no 282 
management plan. The MRI provides advice on Total Allowable Catches (TACs) based on 283 
fishing mortality (F) reference point proxies, but the fishery is regulated through licenses and 284 
effort restrictions (MSC, 2016; Kennedy et al., 2015).  285 
The fishery is of limited importance for the national economy but is of high socio-economic 286 
importance in many small fishing villages. Participants in the fishery are all members of the 287 
National Association of Small Boat Owners (NASBO) which represents the entire fishery 288 
concerning most issues. 289 
2.3.2 The Icelandic mixed demersal fishery 290 
This fishery is relatively simple in terms of biology and management, and benefits from high 291 
data availability. The fishery primarily targets Icelandic stocks of cod, haddock and saithe 292 
(respectively Gadus morhua, Melanogrammus aeglefinus and Pollachius virens, all from the 293 
family Gadidae). A harvest control rule was adopted in 2009 for cod and in 2014 for haddock 294 
and saithe (IF, 2017). The fisheries management authority and the decision-making process 295 
are as in the previous case.  296 
The fishery is managed by Individual Transferable Quotas and involves two groups of 297 
permanent quota entitlements. Group1 consists of about 400 small (<15 m) vessels restricted 298 
to using hand-line or long-line, accounting for ~14% of the demersal catches. Group2 299 
involves around 300 larger vessels, including trawlers, accounting for ~84% of the demersal 300 
catches. The IMII allocates ~2% of the demersal TAC to an open access fishery for ~ 700 301 
small (<13 m) handline boats. Finally, it allocates ~ 8% of the demersal TAC to facilitate new 302 
entries into the fishery, or support regional development or environmentally friendly 303 
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initiatives. The latter “incentive quotas”, are primarily utilized by vessels operating within 304 
Group1 or by small coastal vessels without quotas. Almost all NASBO members are within 305 
Group1 or own vessels without quotas. Group2 are members of Fisheries Iceland (SFS), 306 
formerly known as the Federation of Icelandic fishing vessel owners (LIU). 307 
Operators in the mixed demersal fishery are engaged in shaping management policy. Unlike 308 
the lumpfish fishery, the cod fishery brings together heterogeneous harvesters that operate 309 
vessels within different fleet segments, and with potentially diverging fisheries interests. 310 
Whereas both SFS and NASBO support the current quota management system, those taking 311 
part in the open access coastal fisheries would like to see it changed. These differences make 312 
a comprehensive shift towards co-management difficult. 313 
 314 
2.3.3 The Portuguese crustacean trawl fishery 315 
This mixed fishery targets several deepwater crustaceans located on soft sediments on the 316 
continental slope off the Southwest and South Portuguese coasts at depths > 150 m. The most 317 
important target species are rose shrimp (Parapenaeus longirostris, Penaeidae) and Norway 318 
lobster (Nephrops norvegicus, Nephropidae) but red, purple and scarlet shrimps (respectively 319 
Aristeus antennatus, Aristaeomorpha foliacea and Aristaeopsis edwardsiana, all from the 320 
family Aristaeidae) are sporadically targeted in specific areas. Significant commercial finfish 321 
bycatch species include blue whiting (Micromesistius poutassou, Gadidae), European hake 322 
(Merluccius merluccius, Gadidae) and Atlantic horse mackerel (Trachurus trachurus, 323 
Carangidae) (Silva et al., 2009, 2015). 324 
The fishery is managed under the CFP. The responsibility for implementing the fisheries 325 
policy at national level lies with the Ministry of the Sea and is delegated to the Deputy State 326 
Secretary for the Sea. The Portuguese General Directorate for Natural Resources, Safety and 327 
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Marine Services (DGRM) is responsible for fisheries management activities, drafting national 328 
regulations, distributing quotas, monitoring and enforcement.  329 
The fishery includes 26 Portuguese trawlers (20-29 m length). In addition, five Spanish 330 
licences were granted under a bilateral agreement. Operators are organized in vessel owners’ 331 
associations, with 12 Portuguese trawlers represented by the Associação dos Armadores das 332 
Pescas Industriais (ADAPI); Spanish vessels by the Association de Armadores de Punta del 333 
Moral (AAPM). The fact that the fishery involves vessels from two different countries, which 334 
are not subjected to the same set of regulations, may impede progress towards common co-335 
management arrangements. 336 
 337 
2.3.4 North Sea mixed demersal fisheries 338 
North Sea demersal fisheries involve a number of fleets and species, but are data rich. The 339 
largest fleets are operated by the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Denmark (STECF, 340 
2011). The fisheries target valuable species such as cod, haddock, and whiting (Merlangius 341 
merlangus, Gadidae), but also saithe, plaice (Pleuronectes platessa, Pleuronectidae), sole 342 
(Solea solea, Soleidae), Norway lobster, European hake and anglerfish (mainly Lophius 343 
piscatorius, Lophiidae). A revised CFP was implemented in 2014 to improve conservation 344 
and achieve long-term economic viability for the fishing industry (EU, 2013).The reform 345 
includes a landing obligation (discard ban) which presents difficulties in the presence of  346 
species with small quotas, “choke species”, which may induce a premature closure (Baudron 347 
and Fernandes, 2014).  348 
Demersal fisheries in the North Sea feature many nations, fleet types, fishermen’s 349 
associations and producer organizations, which altogether may render a comprehensive co-350 
management arrangement difficult. The fishing industry is organized into a number of 351 
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national and international associations and Producer Organizations (POs) (Santiago et al., 352 
2015). The North Sea Advisory Council (NSAC) is a key arena for stakeholder participation 353 
in fisheries management, with representatives from the fishing industry organizations as well 354 
as environmental NGOs. However, its role in participatory governance may be hampered by 355 
difficulties to provide consensus based advice (Hatchard and Gray, 2014).  356 
 357 
3. Results 358 
Outcomes from the pilot studies are reported with a focus on: description of the agents 359 
(authority, operator and auditor), OTs, details of the MP, and an assessment of the simulated 360 
planning process. This assessment addresses the involved agents’ perceptions of the RBM 361 
process and outcomes of model simulations indicating if the MP was likely to achieve the 362 
OTs.  363 
3.1 The Icelandic lumpfish fishery 364 
Assisted by a group of project researchers, NASBO was the “operator” and developed the 365 
MP. The IMII was positive to the pilot study, but did not participate in it. A different group of 366 
project researchers therefore represented the role of the “authority”. An accredited 367 
certification body was identified as potential “auditor”, but the audit function was performed 368 
by a separate research group. 369 
The Icelandic fisheries management act identifies the key objectives for the management of 370 
living marine resources in Icelandic waters (IP, 2006). The goals are to promote the 371 
conservation and efficient utilisation of marine resources and ensure stable employment, 372 
economic viability and maintain settlement in rural areas. The “authority” and the “operators” 373 
agreed on two OTs: A biological OT for lumpfish to maintain fishing mortality (Fproxy) < 0.75, 374 
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which is the MSY proxy used by the MRI to provide TAC advice (MSC 2016). A socio-375 
economic OT was defined which set requirements for the geographical distribution of issued 376 
licenses due to the regional importance of the fishery. 377 
An MP was developed in dialogue with various stakeholders. The MP built on existing 378 
regulations but included new elements, notably that NASBO would be responsible for issuing 379 
licenses, deciding on annual effort limits, deciding on sanctions, and for monitoring 380 
compliance. NASBO would obtain the funding necessary for meeting these responsibilities 381 
through the sale of licenses (currently issued by the Directorate of Fisheries). A significant 382 
change, agreed by all parties, was an obligation to land the whole fish, not only roe, in order 383 
to enhance job creation and export value.  384 
Likely outcomes of implementing the MP were estimated by a computer simulation in 385 
StellaTM, taking into consideration recruitment, growth rate, harvest rate, effort, costs, 386 
revenues, profits, the number of jobs in catching and processing, as well as spatial 387 
considerations regarding landings and job creation (Sigurðardóttir and Gunnlaugsson, 2012). 388 
The Icelandic lumpfish fishery appeared as a promising case for RBM. Simulations over a 20-389 
year period indicated that both OTs would be achieved, and that the obligation to land whole 390 
fish would result in a 50% increase in employment in the processing sector. The fishery is 391 
spatially well defined and little impact on other species or the marine environment. The 392 
prospects of applying RBM were strengthened by the fact that all operators are members of a 393 
single organisation, which could act on behalf of the entire fishery. NASBO has an incentive 394 
to collect additional biological and market data to improve stock assessment, market forecasts 395 
and control of supply. A main weakness of the pilot study was that the actual authority was 396 
not involved.   397 
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3.2 The Icelandic mixed demersal fishery 398 
LIU did not participate in this pilot study, and gave no particular reason. One obvious reason 399 
could be that LIU is content with the present quota management system. The ITQ system has 400 
been contested since it came into effect, with initial allocation and transferability of quotas, 401 
and sharing of the resource rent being especially thorny issues (Matthiasson and Agnarsson, 402 
2009; Benediktsson and Karlsdottir, 2011; Agnarsson, Matthiasson and Giry, 2016; 403 
Kokorsch, Karlsdottir and Benediktsson 2016; Chambers and Carothers, 2017). Without LIU, 404 
the main agents involved were those involved in the previous case, restricting the pilot study 405 
to smaller jig and line vessels and vessels without quotas, comprising approximately 14-18% 406 
of total demersal catches.  407 
Representing almost all vessel owners within this category, NASBO was actively involved as 408 
the “operator”. Groups of researchers respectively represented the agencies of “authority” and 409 
“auditor”. The “authority” and NASBO agreed on 19 OTs (of which seven, outlined here in 410 
italics, were new): spawning stock biomass (SSB) for cod, haddock, saithe, golden redfish, 411 
Atlantic catfish, tusk and common ling > MSY thresholds; F < FMSY (for eight bycatch 412 
species); bycatch % limits by species; an obligation to land all catches; 20% of Earnings 413 
Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization (EBITDA) is paid as public resource 414 
rent; zero non-fuel subsidies; EBITDA of fishing companies > 0 (average for planning 415 
period); > 17% of demersal TACs for J&L vessels < 15 m; > 80% of catches landed in 416 
villages with < 5000 inhabitants; company specific ownership of quota < 12%; average 417 
wages in the sector > national average; annual recruitment of new workers > 1%; all 418 
primary processing in Iceland. NASBO’s proposal incorporated the “incentive quotas” into 419 
Group1 and invited vessel-owners without quotas into that system. The MP covered 17% of 420 
the total demersal catches in Icelandic waters, of which 12% would be allocated based on 421 
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present quota ownership. The remaining 5% would be entrusted to a quota bank operated by 422 
NASBO to promote achievement of OTs and fund involved expenses.  423 
NASBO committed to the operator role and invested work in developing an MP for the 424 
identified fishery share, although some of its members did not assent to all OTs. Part of the 425 
disagreement related to the reallocation of the “incentive quotas” through a quota bank. MRI 426 
would continue to provide stock information.  427 
Likely outcomes of implementing the MP for a 10-year period were assessed mainly by 428 
computer simulation (Sigurðardóttir et al., 2013), but status could be assessed for only nine 429 
OTs due to data limitations. The performance of the MP could therefore not be evaluated 430 
fully. The simulations suggested that the biological OTs for cod, haddock, saithe and golden 431 
redfish were likely to be achieved, but as the MP only covered 17% of the fishery, the 432 
achievement of biological OTs would be driven by the fisheries not participating in the MP 433 
(which were assumed to be governed by current harvest control rules). The fact that the 434 
operator would not be in a position to control the achievement of these OTs through their own 435 
actions represented a major drawback, and shows that these OTs were inappropriate. It may 436 
be possible to define achievable stock OTs for this operator by making them relative to catch 437 
proportions (partial SSB and F). Otherwise, defining stock OTs will either require sufficient 438 
operator participation to present a clear majority of the catches, or it will not be possible to 439 
delegate responsibility for achieving such OTs. The OT for Atlantic catfish could not be 440 
reached, and limited data made it impossible to make stock estimates for tusk and ling. 441 
The high number of OTs complicated the RBM arrangements, and set high requirements for 442 
the collection of data for assessment and audit. A smaller set of OTs would have been more 443 
feasible. The organization representing the majority of the catches did not participate in the 444 
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pilot study, and this was a significant weakness. Hence, this pilot study demonstrated the 445 
importance of including a good majority of those engaged in the fishery in the MP. 446 
 447 
3.3 The Portuguese crustacean bottom trawl fishery 448 
The DGRM was involved in the initial phase of the pilot study, where the general 449 
management goals and OTs were defined. Other interest groups, such as consumers’ 450 
associations, market organizations and NGOs were also involved in this phase. The role of the 451 
authority was performed by a research group. Assisted by researchers, the operator comprised 452 
the two most important associations of ship owners involved in the fisheries, i.e. the 453 
Portuguese ADAPI and the Spanish (AAPM).  IPMA acted as the auditor. 454 
Stakeholders and authorities agreed on the following OTs (Silva et al., 2015): biomass indices 455 
Catch Per Unit Effort (CPUE) >MSY CPUEtrigger for rose shrimp and Norway lobster; reduce 456 
discards to ≤ 50% in the first five years and to ≤ 25% in the following five years; fishing 457 
company EBITDA > 0 (average for 10-year period); on board training opportunities provided 458 
for at least 25 new workers during a 10-year period; establish formal cooperation between 459 
operators and a scientific institution for improving data collection in order to enhance stock 460 
assessment and advice.  Performance indicators were defined in the MP to measure the 461 
success of the strategies used to achieve the OTs and the extent to which they were achieved. 462 
Depending on the OT, these indicators were to be evaluated in different assessment periods 463 
during the 10-year MP period. 464 
Rewards for compliance and good practices as well as sanctions and corrective measures 465 
concerning observed deviations from the OTs were defined, including fines and temporary 466 
fishing restrictions. Incentives (fishing days, quota) would encourage the use of selective 467 
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gears and/or bycatch reduction devices.  To ensure proper monitoring of OTs, a 468 
documentation system was proposed, which included the existing system of electronic 469 
reporting, more detailed paper logbooks for reporting the retained catches and discards, vessel 470 
activity information, economic and financial reports, and other arrangements between the 471 
operators and research institutions to gather data. 472 
The design and application of the RBM process in the Portuguese crustacean bottom trawl 473 
fishery was understood by all stakeholders involved. Interaction between Portuguese and 474 
Spanish operators and scientific research institutes was regarded as a milestone for the 475 
fishery, and a cross-national PO was proposed to strengthen fishers’ collaboration and market 476 
influence. The fishery is currently subjected to a high number of detailed regulations, which 477 
are perceived to be inappropriate. Chiefly, the prospect of developing an alternative to the 478 
recovery plan for Southern hake and Iberian Norway lobster (EC, 2005) promoted stakeholder 479 
involvement. 480 
The implementation of the MP was simulated using a Rule-Based Fuzzy Cognitive Map 481 
model (Wise et al., 2015). Four different scenarios were simulated corresponding to gear 482 
modifications aimed at reducing discards. Outcomes regarding Economic (EBITDA) and 483 
social OTs could not be simulated and effects of a cooperation to improve data collection 484 
could not be assessed. The model evaluated outcomes regarding CPUE for the two main 485 
target species and total revenue as a proxy for EBITDA. Results indicated that these OTs 486 
would be achieved throughout the planning period in most scenarios (Wise et al., 2015).   487 
Some issues need to be resolved before RBM can be successfully implemented in this fishery. 488 
In particular, additional incentives must be deployed to encourage operators to participate in 489 
RBM, and ways to finance the monitoring and auditing processes must be established and 490 
agreed on (Silva et al., 2015). RBM was well accepted by the operators because clear 491 
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objectives for the crustacean fishery were set. Other positive aspects of the MP development, 492 
as opposed to the present management regime, included that it implied the same rules for all 493 
and would replace an unpopular recovery plan. 494 
 495 
3.4 North Sea mixed demersal fisheries 496 
The pilot study was restricted to the Scottish TR1 fleet (trawlers other than beam trawl, with a 497 
cod-end mesh size > 100 mm) to ensure MP development in consultation with stakeholders 498 
within a reasonable timeframe. Following the example set by Kerby et al. (2012), using ICES 499 
Catch Statistics, Scottish fleets were identified as the largest contributor to the North Sea 500 
landings of demersal finfish species in 2013 (22%) followed by Norway (15%) and the 501 
Netherlands (12%). Three key agents were identified. The authority was Marine Scotland 502 
(MS), which is a directorate of the Scottish government, responsible for the promotion of 503 
sustainable, profitable and well-managed fish resources. The operator was the North East 504 
group of Scotland Fishermen’s Organisation (NESFO) which represents and assists Scottish 505 
fishers as catchers and producers. The auditor was Marine Scotland Science (MSS), which 506 
undertakes research and provides scientific and technical advice on fisheries issues, and is a 507 
distinct Division of Marine Scotland reviewed by an independent Science Advisory Board.  508 
Biological, economic and social OTs were identified to address the sustainable exploitation of 509 
fish stocks, a profitable fishing industry and employment stability. Biological OTs were the 510 
following species-specific fishing mortalities (F) targeting MSY as defined by ICES (2012): 511 
Fcod< 0.19, Fhaddock< 0.3, Fwhiting< 0.22 (no FMSY value was defined for whiting and ICES 512 
(2012) recommended an FTarget of 0.22), Fsaithe< 0.3 and Fhake< 0.24. Fishers were required to 513 
land all catches of commercial species by 2017. Economic OTs aimed at achieving a 15% 514 
EBITDA, while maintaining year-to-year changes in landings below 15%. Social OTs specify 515 
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that the quota share of a single company to be less than 12% and that a minimum of 15% of 516 
the catch should be sold to local processors (the town of the landing port). 517 
The MP included new management strategies developed specifically to reach the OTs, 518 
including the Danish example of catch quota trials (Dalskov and Kindt-Larsen, 2009) but also 519 
built on existing regulations: skippers in the MP were allocated catch quotas, which were 520 
slightly higher than the current landing quotas and these could be traded among skippers. 521 
Remaining quota (attributed to non-active skippers) was administrated by the operator, and 522 
could be purchased as extra quota by skippers. To facilitate a gradual use of quota as needed 523 
throughout the year, and to avoid a race to fish, the price of the extra quota would be set by 524 
the operator at a high level at the start of the year and subsequently decline to reach the actual 525 
market price at the end of the year. Each year, skippers in the MP must have agreed 526 
individually with the operator on a fishing plan specifying how they will use their allocated 527 
quotas for each species throughout the year. These fishing plans took into account the 528 
seasonality of species, helping the operator foresee related complications such as discards. 529 
Discards were to be monitored by fully documented fishery schemes as implemented in 530 
experiments in Scotland and Denmark (Kindt-Larsen et al., 2011). Participating vessels 531 
should be equipped with a Remote Electronic Monitoring system including winch weight 532 
sensors and cameras recording catch information on each fishing event. Skippers would have 533 
equal opportunities to purchase additional quota provided that they follow the obligation to 534 
land all catches of TAC species. To avoid speculation, a single purchase could not exceed 5% 535 
of the total available quota.  Skippers were to sell at least 15% of their production to local fish 536 
processors or markets for local consumption. When committing to sell at least 50% of their 537 
catches locally, skippers would be selling under a label of locally and sustainably caught fish 538 
set by the operator in agreement with the authority and regulations in place, which would 539 
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guarantee transparency of the supply chain and reduced carbon emissions from transport, 540 
potentially granting access to new markets. 541 
The RBM concept was well received and stakeholders showed interest in being involved in 542 
MP development. Most of the MP elements proposed by the operator were already in place 543 
and/or ready to be implemented (e.g. NESFO already trades quotas to provide member 544 
skippers with additional quota to avoid discarding). Therefore, it would be relatively 545 
straightforward, in theory, to merge these elements in order to implement RBM. Stakeholders’ 546 
enthusiasm towards potential involvement in developing management strategies showed 547 
promise for an actual implementation of RBM. The iteration process as designed by RBM 548 
performed well: the first MP version was reviewed by the authority (Marine Scotland), 549 
allowing the operator to address raised issues and improve the MP. The authority and the 550 
operator came up with constructive ideas about the implementation of RBM without any 551 
major conflicts between the two agencies. 552 
The most significant weakness of this pilot study was that it included only a single fleet 553 
segment of a single country of the North Sea mixed demersal fisheries. A full-scale 554 
implementation of RBM would be a much more complex given the high number of countries 555 
and fleet segments involved, and would require that a clear majority of skippers join in and 556 
abide by the MP. Nonetheless, the cooperation on developing an MP through RBM proved 557 
rather successful and could be reproduced on a larger scale. Although the operator welcomed 558 
the RBM concept and their increased involvement in management decisions, concerns were 559 
raised about the possible lack of incentives (i.e. only slight increases in quotas) for skippers to 560 
join and commit to the MP since participation is voluntary. While biological and economic 561 
OTs were widely accepted, criticisms were raised regarding technicalities of the social OTs. 562 
For instance, the OT stating that 15% of vessels catches should be sold locally was judged 563 
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problematic because local processors do not always exist, however mitigating clauses could 564 
be inserted. 565 
 566 
4. Discussion 567 
4.1 Performance of the RBM framework in pilot studies 568 
The methodology of using artificial planning and evaluation processes to assess the feasibility 569 
of alternative management arrangements sets constraints for the type of conclusions that can 570 
be drawn from this study. First, the actors might have displayed different attitudes if the RBM 571 
was going to be implemented in reality. Second, the pilot studies were limited to the initial 572 
steps of planning and evaluating the MP, and did not allow simulations of the further process 573 
of implementing and adapting MPs. Conducted in cooperation with relevant agents, the pilot 574 
studies nevertheless illustrate potentials and constraints with regard to using RBM as a model 575 
for an industrial organization approach to co-management.  576 
Most of the identified relevant operators expressed genuine interest in participating, motivated 577 
from the belief that the RBM initiative would potentially contribute to a more effective and 578 
legitimate management system. Most enthusiasm came from cases which had significant 579 
weaknesses in the current approach (Icelandic lumpfish fishery and the Portuguese case).  580 
In the Icelandic mixed demersal case, disagreements about allocation issues surfaced in 581 
relation to NASBO’s proposal of operating a quota bank. This illustrates the importance of 582 
avoiding that the implementation of any new system, including RBM, is used as an arena for 583 
arguing about allocation rights. 584 
The organisation that represented the largest collective share of the Icelandic mixed demersal 585 
fisheries (LIU), declined to participate. This severely limited the potential of an MP, as 586 
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operators would not be in a position deliver on OTs relating to the whole stock. This case also 587 
illustrated that in an ecosystem approach, as pursued here, there is a need to avoid too many 588 
OTs with associated indicators (Jennings, 2005) as this will complicate the MP and 589 
undermine the scope for flexible and efficient management arrangements.   590 
As in the previous case, the MP for the North Sea mixed demersal fishery was constrained by 591 
the fact that the operators represented only about 22% of the total catch. In this case, it would 592 
be highly challenging to achieve full coverage of the fisheries in question due to the 593 
international scope of operators, distributed over several countries and speaking different 594 
languages.  595 
Except for the North Sea study, a major problem was the lack of participation and support 596 
from relevant authorities in the pilot studies. In the Icelandic studies, the authorities seemed 597 
reluctant to participate due to concerns that this would be perceived to reflect approval of 598 
initiatives that were not established within the existing policy context, and hence exempted 599 
from democratic accountability. Besides the fact that the pilot studies represented a research 600 
initiative, with no actual implementation considered, this concern seems unjustified, as RBM 601 
is designed as an approach to implement existing policies by making their objectives explicit, 602 
and by delegating responsibility for their achievement. The reluctance of authorities to 603 
delegate power is well known from other contexts. However, power delegation is necessary to 604 
allow users to design and implement effective means to achieve required results (Moynihan, 605 
2006). In general, RBM depends on trust and cooperation between contracting partners, and it 606 
cannot be pursued without broad political support.  607 
Finally, in many pilot studies, it proved difficult to define OTs with all required properties: 608 
relevant, measurable, and achievable through actions taken by the operators. Fitzpatrick et al. 609 
(2011) argue that outcomes in RBM preferably should be defined in terms of in-situ measures, 610 
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which are directly observable and can be controlled by actions taken on a vessel level. 611 
However, RBM on organizational level makes it necessary to rely on OTs defined in terms of 612 
ex-situ measures (e.g. stock indicators). Drawbacks of ex-situ measures include that they are 613 
not observable in real time and that outcomes are likely to be influenced by external factors. 614 
The challenges with relying on ex-situ measures will remain when delegating responsibility to 615 
resource users. Limitations of OTs and systems for information and control must be 616 
considered when evaluating how operators in RBM can be held to account for management 617 
outcomes. Operators should not be judged by a higher standard of accountability and proof 618 
than expected from authorities in an equivalent top-down management system.           619 
 620 
4.2 Advantages and drawbacks of the RBM framework 621 
Different approaches to fisheries governance are underpinned by different rationales and 622 
values (Gray, 2005). RBM combines advantages from participatory and representative 623 
governance approaches as public authorities remain in control of the policy setting, while the 624 
responsibility for management and implementation is conditionally delegated to user groups. 625 
RBM is aligned with market-based governance as it deploys incentive structures that reward 626 
operators for innovation and for contributing to the knowledge base for fisheries management. 627 
The flexibility of the RBM allows operators to improve the cost-efficiency of management 628 
and implementation strategies as long as they provide adequate documentation and achieve 629 
OTs in the agreed period. This allows operators to tailor management strategies to comply 630 
with policy requirements while advancing their own objectives and making use of local 631 
knowledge and resources. RBM is responsive as its documentation system and audit 632 
framework allow for timely interventions and adaptive management. The system enhances 633 
transparency through the public hearing of the MP and publication of the audit report and 634 
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process log. RBM is aligned with cost recovery as it shifts management responsibilities and 635 
the burden of proof, and the associated costs, to resource users.  636 
Operators should represent a good majority of the participants in the fishery. This necessitates 637 
strong incentives, or that RBM is made mandatory. RBM is likely to involve relatively high 638 
costs for operators, mainly in the short term, as they take on increasing responsibility for data 639 
collection and the implementation of management measures (Townsend, 2010a). This 640 
suggests that voluntary RBM arrangements will only be feasible and worthwhile to pursue for 641 
operators when they can plan and make decisions for the large majority of the fishery. This 642 
requires that participants are sufficiently homogenous regarding interests and perspectives to 643 
enable common planning, which is more likely in simple governance situations (fewer 644 
nations, gear types, etc.). It is difficult for resource users to manage large-scale, transboundary 645 
resource systems, as this requires that they cooperate effectively through joint organisations 646 
(Singleton, 1999). The high costs also imply that voluntary RBM arrangements will be more 647 
likely to be pursued for resources of high values or large volumes, or for fisheries where a 648 
large number of fishers are organised by one effective operator. 649 
Alternatively, authorities may require that resource users develop acceptable management 650 
plans and document the sustainability of their activities in exchange for access to exploit 651 
publically owned marine resources. This approach will likely be resisted by the industry 652 
where access has previously been granted without such obligations. However, the flexibility 653 
of the RBM framework allows for alternative distributions of resource management 654 
responsibilities and costs.  655 
RBM requires that operators develop the necessary organisational capacity and foster 656 
leadership. For instance, the disagreement between members of operator organizations 657 
regarding certain OTs illustrates how leadership and approaches to collective decision-making 658 
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become important when resource user organisations are involved in management processes. 659 
This requires that the organisations develop ways to resolve conflicts, clarify mandates, and 660 
establish processes to ensure legitimacy of decisions. Operators will initially have limited 661 
experience and organizational capacity. However, once developed, an increased 662 
organizational capacity is a generic asset that provides a basis for adapting in response to 663 
environmental or regulatory change (McClenachan et al., 2015).  664 
 665 
5. Conclusions 666 
The RBM framework presents a model of an ‘industrial organization’ approach to co-667 
management, distinguished by entrusting operators with new management responsibilities 668 
specified in relation to the achievement of objectives and documentation requirements. While 669 
the functions of a given management system may remain quite similar when shifting from a 670 
traditional management system to RBM, the responsibility for undertaking most of them 671 
shifts from the authority to operators and auditors. This, however, represents a significant 672 
change, which requires that such agents develop new capacities, and that legal and regulative 673 
frameworks are reconsidered. Our pilot studies suggest that a rapid switch to RBM is unlikely 674 
to be acceptable to authorities and operators. Therefore, a change to RBM will probably be 675 
gradual, enabling operators and authorities to develop trust and capacity while the scope of 676 
mutual responsibilities is specified. The reversal of burden of proof may be phased in, as 677 
responsibility for tasks of monitoring, documentation and control is transferred. The process 678 
and the above mentioned issues need to be properly documented when RBM is implemented 679 
in real life cases to promote learning and allow for further research.  680 
The factors identified by Ostrom (2009) to enhance the likelihood of achieving sustainable 681 
social-ecological systems through self-organisation are also relevant here. These suggest that 682 
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RBM is most likely to succeed where resources are well contained, of limited mobility, 683 
potentially productive, valuable, have predictable dynamics, leadership is effective, there are 684 
shared values, and there is good knowledge about the fisheries. Some of our case studies had 685 
these traits but none had them all. European examples of fisheries with all of these traits 686 
include high value shellfish and some pelagic fisheries.  687 
Trends towards RBM like arrangements are observed in Europe as stakeholder organizations 688 
increasingly get involved in management (Hegland and Wilson, 2009; Holmes et al., 2011; 689 
Stange et al., 2014). Deploying RBM ideas, the 2014 CFP reform aspires to reduce micro-690 
management and move towards regionalized management, enabling regulations to be adapted 691 
to specific areas. A new proposal for technical regulations is very much in line with RBM as 692 
presented here as it is formulated as a generic regulation, which establishes a basis for 693 
decentralized technical regulations, tailored to achieve policy objectives (EC, 2016). Hence, 694 
although our research indicates that a full scale RBM is unlikely to be implemented in the 695 
near future, it is also clear that European fisheries governance is moving in that direction. The 696 
rock lobster fishers of New Zealand have successfully adopted principles that characterise the 697 
presented RBM and it remains to be seen how and when others will follow suit. 698 
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Table 1.  Overview of pilot studies investigated for the feasibility of RBM. CFP = Common 927 
Fisheries Policy; GFCM = General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean.  Cases are 928 
arranged, from left to right, in order of expected difficulty in applying RBM. 929 
 Icelandic 
lumpfish 
fishery  
Icelandic 
mixed 
demersal 
fishery  
Portuguese 
crustacean trawl 
fishery  
North Sea 
mixed 
demersal 
fishery  
Northern 
Adriatic mixed 
demersal trawl 
fishery  
Complexity of 
Management 
context  
Low: Single 
nation, national 
policy 
framework  
Low: Single 
nation, national 
policy 
framework 
Intermediate: 
Single nation; 
allocations to 
other country; 
CFP  framework 
High: Several 
nations;  CFP 
framework 
 
High: Several 
nations; GFCM 
and CFP 
frameworks 
Complexity of   
fisheries  
Low: one 
target species; 
low bycatch 
level  
Low:  mixed 
fishery with 
few target 
species 
Intermediate: 
Several target and 
bycatch species 
High: several 
target and 
bycatch  
species; 
multiple fleets 
and gear-types 
Very high: high 
species diversity  
Availability of 
data for stock 
assessment 
Low: Data 
collection does 
not prioritize  
the addressed 
species     
High: 
Abundant data 
of  high quality 
 Intermediate: 
Abundant data of 
intermediate 
quality 
High: Abundant 
data of  high 
quality 
Low: Intermediate 
occurrence of data 
of relatively low 
quality  
 930 
 931 
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 932 
Fig. 1.  A framework for Results Based Management (RBM) in fisheries. The framework 933 
involves three agents: i) the authority, a democratically accountable entity responsible for 934 
resource management. It oversees the RBM processes and issues management plan (MP) 935 
invitations, which include the specification of measurable and achievable objectives (outcome 936 
targets: OTs). It can approve or reject operators’ MP proposals; ii) the operator, an organized 937 
group of resource users, e.g. fishers, with rights in a given fishery. The operator develops, 938 
proposes and implements an MP, which includes strategies for achieving OTs and for 939 
documenting the effectiveness of chosen means; iii) the auditor, an independent agent with 940 
capacity to audit MP performance. The auditor reviews documentation, evaluates the extent to 941 
which OTs have been achieved, and submits the audit to the authority and operator(s). The 942 
system proceeds from left to right starting with the dialogues between operators and authority 943 
to agree on the involved process. 944 
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